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ABSTRACT
Many stock market analysts think that in 1929, at the time of the crash, stocks were overvalued.
Irving Fisher argued just before the crash that fundamentals were strong and the stock market was
undervalued. In this paper, we use growth theory to estimate the fundamental value of corporate
equity and compare it to actual stock valuations. Our estimate is based on values of productive
corporate capital, both tangible and intangible, and tax rates on corporate income and distribu-
tions. The evidence strongly suggests that Fisher was right. Even at the 1929 peak, stocks were
undervalued relative to the prediction of theory.
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“Fisher Says Prices of Stocks Are Low,”said a headline in the New York Times on
October 22, 1929, referring to economist Irving Fisher. Two days later, the stock market
crashed, and by the end of November the New York Stock Exchange was down 30 percent
from its peak. Fisher had based his statement on strong earnings reports, few industrial
disputes, and evidence of high investment in research and development (R&D) and in other
intangible capital. But since market prices fell dramatically so soon after Fisher’s statement,
most analysts and economic historians concluded that Fisher was wrong: in October 1929
stocks were overvalued.
In this paper, we use modern growth theory to evaluate this conclusion. When stocks of
corporations are correctly priced, this theory says, their market value should equal the value
of corporations’ productive assets, what we will call the fundamental value of corporations.2
Productive assets include both tangible and intangible assets. We have direct measures of
corporate tangible capital and land and of the tax rates that aﬀect the prices of these assets.
We also have measures of proﬁts and the growth rate of the economy which, together with
the tangible capital measures, allow us to infer the size of the stock of intangible capital in
the corporate sector. We thus can compare the total value of corporate productive assets to
the actual market value of corporate stocks at the time of the crash.
Our results support Fisher’s view. A conservative estimate of the fundamental value of
U.S. corporations in 1929—which assumes as low a value for intangible capital as observations
allow—is at least 21 times the value of after-tax corporate earnings (or 1.9 times gross
national product or GNP). The highest estimate of the actual 1929 market value of corporate
1stocks (based on samples of publicly traded stocks) is 19 times the value of after-tax corporate
earnings at their peak in 1929 (or 1.67 times GNP). This is strong evidence that Fisher was
right: stock prices in the fall of 1929 were a little low relative to fundamental values.
Our estimate of the fundamental value of corporations depends in an important way on
the value of intangible capital owned by corporations. Fisher’s (1930) conclusion that the
stock market was not overvalued in August of 1929 followed from his view that the corporate
stock of intangible capital was large. We ﬁnd that only if the value of corporate intangible
capital was zero and the real return on tangible capital was very high by historical standards
would the conclusion—reached by De Long and Shleifer (1991) and Rappoport and White
(1993)—that the stock market was 30 percent overvalued follow.
The question then is how big is the stock of corporate intangible capital. Fisher (1930)
provides many examples of intangible investments, but was limited to anecdotal evidence to
make his case that the stock in 1929 was large. We do not have direct measures either, but we
use national income statistics to construct an estimate.3 We show that even for the smallest
level of intangible capital consistent with the data, the stock market in October 1929 was
not overvalued relative to the predictions of theory. We estimate that the stock of intangible
corporate capital was sizable—at least 60 percent of the stock of tangible corporate capital.
If stock prices were not inﬂated beyond their fundamental values in October 1929, why
did the market crash? Answering that question is not addressed here. But we can point out
here that the dramatic decline in stock prices is consistent with monetary policy actions at
the time.4 Before the crash, the Federal Reserve severely tightened credit to stock investors







Five Estimates of Market Value of All U.S. Corporations on August 30, 1929
Based on Subsets of Corporations
Market Value of Price/ Estimated Total
Data Source Companies Covered Earnings Market Value/
and Coverage ($ billions) Ratio GNP
Sloan (1936), 135 industrials 30.8 17.5 1.54
S&P, 50 industrials 26.2 18.4 1.62
S&P, 90 composite 43.3 19.0 1.67
Fisher (1930), 45 industrials n.a. 14.1 1.24
NYSE, 846 listed 89.7 n.a. 1.24
absorption of the country’s credit in speculative security operations to an alarming extent”
(Federal Reserve Board, 1929, pp. 1-2). Not long after the crash, the Fed eased credit, and








































To assess Fisher’s view that stock prices in 1929 were low, we ﬁrst report estimates
for the market value of U.S. corporations at the end of August 1929, when stock prices
peaked. By “market value”here, we mean the market capitalization of corporations. Data
are available for large, representative subsets of U.S. corporations. Here, we use these data
to produce a range of estimates for the market value of all U.S. corporations.
Table 1 reports ﬁve estimates of the market value of all U.S. corporations at the end of
August 1929 relative to GNP in 1929. The ﬁrst four estimates are obtained by multiplying
the ratio of price to after-tax earnings (the P/E ratio) for a subset of corporations by the
total U.S. after-tax corporate proﬁts of the U.S. economy. All estimates are relative to 1929
3GNP. This is a good way to estimate the total market value as long as the P/E ratio for
the set of corporations is near the P/E ratio for the corporate sector as a whole. Also
reported in Table 1 are the market value relative to GNP and the P/E ratio for each subset
of companies. The ﬁfth estimate in Table 1 is obtained by multiplying the market value
of all companies trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) by a factor that held
throughout the post–World War II period; for that period, we have data on the market value
of all corporations from the Federal Reserve Board’s U.S. ﬂow of funds accounts (Federal
Reserve Board, 1945–2000).6
In the table, the estimates for the market value of U.S. corporations range between
1.24 and 1.67 times GNP. We think that the best estimate is 1.54 times GNP, which is 17.5
times after-tax corporate earnings. This estimate is based on the study of Sloan (1936). The
estimate we will use as the actual market value in our comparison, however, is 1.67 times
GNP in 1929, or 19 times the after-tax corporate earnings in 1929, based on the Standard
and Poor’s (S&P) composite price index. By using a high estimate of the market value, we
are being conservative in evaluating Fisher’s view that the stock market was not overvalued
just before the crash of 1929.
We view the estimate of Sloan (1936) as the best because it is the result of a detailed
study of 135 industrial corporations, using the best data available at the time. The study
was done at the Standard Statistics Company, which later merged with Poor’s Publishing
to become Standard and Poor’s. The corporations studied had fully documented ﬁnancial
histories over the 1922–33 period and were thought to be representative of large companies
in business at that time. The study provides detailed income accounts and balance sheets












The Ratio of After-Tax Corporate Profits to GNP, 1925-2000
for the aggregate and speciﬁc details for major industries and major corporations.
At the peak of the stock market in late August and early September 1929, the common
stocks of the companies in Sloan’s (1936) sample had a market value of $30.8 billion. This
is about one-third of the market value of all stocks traded on the NYSE at that time. For
the year 1929, the after-tax net proﬁts available for the common stock of these companies
totaled $1.76 billion. If the companies in the Sloan (1936) study are representative of the
U.S. economy, then we can use the market value and after-tax proﬁts for these companies to
get an estimate of the total value of all corporations.
In Figure 1, we plot the annual ratio of economy-wide after-tax corporate proﬁts to GNP
in the United States between 1925 and 2000. Starting in 1929, these data are available in
5the U.S. national income and product accounts (NIPA) published by the BEA in its Survey
of Current Business. For earlier years, we must construct our own measures of after-tax
corporate proﬁts; we do so by applying the BEA’s methodology. (For details of our method,
see U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1985) and Table A1 in our appendix.) For 1929, the
BEA reports after-tax proﬁts equal to 8.8 percent of GNP. Using the BEA’s methodology,
we estimate that while proﬁts were high in 1929, this year was not an outlier. After-tax
proﬁts in all years from 1925 through 1929 were high by postwar standards.
If we multiply the P/E ratio of Sloan (1936), 17.5, by 1929 total NIPA earnings, we
get an estimate for the market value of all corporations in late August and early September
1929 of 1.54 times GNP [= (30.8/1.76)× 0.088].
We use the same procedure with companies in the S&P indices. In Table A2 of our
appendix, we provide a list of the 50 companies in the S&P industrial index, the 20 companies
in the S&P index of railroads, and the 20 companies in the S&P index of public utilities. The
S&P composite stock index comprises these 90 companies. Along with names, we report on
the market capitalization of each company at the end of August 1929 and their net earnings
for the year 1929. The market capitalization is computed with data from the University of
Chicago’s Center for Research on Security Prices (1926-2000) (CRSP). Net earnings are the
after-tax proﬁts for common stockholders, which is the sum of common stock dividends plus
surplus for the year reported by Moody’s Investor Services (1930) and Poor’s Publishing
Company (1930).
For the 50 industrial companies in the S&P index, the ratio of the total market capital-
ization to net earnings is 18.4. Aggregate earnings and this P/E ratio imply an estimate for
6the aggregate market capitalization of 1.62 times GNP. This is slightly higher than Sloan’s
(1936) estimate, which was based on a broader subset of industrial companies.
To compute an estimate of the total market capitalization using all 90 companies in
the S&P composite index, we ﬁrst construct weights on industrials, railroads, and public
utilities using the entire population of companies in the CRSP database for August 1929.
We ﬁnd that the market capitalization of railroads (SIC 4000) in the CRSP population is
12 percent of the total. We ﬁnd that the market capitalization of public utilities—including
electric, gas, and sanitary services (SIC 4900) as well as communications (SIC 4800) and local
and interurban passenger transit (SIC 4100)—accounts for 17 percent of the total market
capitalization of the CRSP population of companies. The remaining 71 percent is assumed
to be in industrials. With weights of 23 percent, 32 percent, and 45 percent on railroads,
utilities, and industrials, respectively, we match aggregate market capitalizations with the
S&P subsample.
If we weight market capitalizations and net earnings for the three S&P categories and
then take the ratio, we have a P/E ratio of 19.0.7 Aggregate earnings and this P/E ratio
imply an estimate for the aggregate market capitalization of 1.67 times GNP, which is close
to that for industrials only.
An estimate of 19.0 for the P/E ratio is signiﬁcantly higher than that reported by Fisher
(1930), who cites the Standard Statistics Company as the source for his data. Fisher’s Chart
11 shows monthly P/E ratios for 45 industrial companies between 1928 and 1929. If we take a
12-month average ending in August 1929, we ﬁnd the P/E ratio to be 14.1, which is consistent
with a total market capitalization of 1.24 times GNP. Unfortunately, there is some ambiguity




















T w oM e a s u r e so ft h eV a l u eo fU . S .C o r p o r a t i o n s ,
End of Year, Relative to GNP, 1925-2000
as to whether Fisher’s numbers are averages of P/E ratios or ratios of market capitalization
to total earnings.
But there is other evidence on the total market capitalization in 1929 that is consistent
with Fisher’s estimate. Throughout the postwar period, the market value of all listed shares
on the NYSE was very near 69 percent of the total value of all domestic corporations reported
by the Federal Reserve Board (1945–2000). We use that statistic to convert NYSE values
to data for all U.S. corporations. In Figure 2, we plot the end-of-year market value of all
listed shares on the NYSE multiplied by 1.45 (or 1/0.69) for the period 1925–2000 and the
end-of-year total value of all domestic companies from the Federal Reserve for the period
1945–2000. The Fed’s measure includes the total value of equity of all publicly traded and
8closely held domestic corporations plus the value of their net debt (debt liabilities less debt
assets). Before 1974, net debt is a small share of the total value. In 1929, net debt is
actually slightly negative, according to the aggregate balance sheet ﬁgures reported in the
Statistics of Income by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (1916–99) (IRS); corporations were
net creditors.8
Figure 2 shows that the market value of NYSE listed shares as a fraction of the total
value of all U.S. companies has been remarkably constant. The two time series in Figure 2
are close for the entire post–World War II period—not only on average, but also at peaks
and troughs. If we assume that the ratio of NYSE values to the total is about 1.45 in the
pre–World War II period as well, we can use the NYSE market capitalization in August
1929 to get an estimate for the total value of all U.S. corporations. The market value of
shares for the 846 companies listed on the NYSE in August 1929 was $89.7 billion. Thus,
our estimate of the total value is about $130 billion (= $89.7 × 1.45), or 1.24 times 1929
GNP. If we assume that aggregate earnings are 8.8 percent of GNP, this implies a P/E ratio
of 14.1, which is the same as Fisher’s (1930) estimate (based on 45 industrial companies).
To summarize, the range of estimates for the market value of all U.S. corporations
relative to GNP is from 1.24 to 1.67. We think that Sloan’s (1936) estimate of 1.54 is the
best, but to be conservative, we will work with the highest estimate of 1.67 times GNP, or













































Now we need an estimate of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations to compare
with the market value just reported. By “fundamental value”here, we mean the value of the
underlying productive assets—both tangible and intangible—of the corporate sector. In this
section, we construct a lower-bound estimate of the fundamental value of U.S. corporations
in August 1929. We show that this estimate exceeds the contemporary market value of
U.S. corporations.
If corporate investments are positive and funded out of retained earnings, growth theory
says that the fundamental value of a corporation should be equal to
V =( 1− τdist)(K





T is the end-of-period resource cost of tangible capital, K
I is the end-of-period
resource cost of intangible capital, τdist is the tax rate on corporate distributions, and τprof
is the tax rate on corporate proﬁts.9 The price of tangible capital for the shareholders
is (1 − τdist), not 1. The distribution tax aﬀects this price because a dollar reinvested is
not taxed, but a dollar distributed is. The price of intangible capital also depends on the
corporate proﬁts tax rate because investments in intangible capital are expensed and reduce
taxable corporate income.







Marginal Tax Rates on U.S. Corporate Income, 1925–29








3.1. Marginal Tax Rates. We start our computation of the fundamental value of cor-
porations by estimating eﬀective tax rates corporations faced in 1929. The two rates we
need are those in equation (1): τdist and τprof.
In Table 2, we report marginal tax rates on U.S. corporate proﬁts and dividends for
the years 1925–29. These are estimates of the tax paid on an additional dollar of these
income types. Calculating the tax rate on proﬁts is straightforward: we take the ratio of
the NIPA proﬁts tax liability to the before-tax proﬁts (from Table A1 in the appendix).
The tax rate on dividends is more complicated: it’s a weighted-average surtax rate on net
income computed from data compiled and published by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(1916–99). In 1929, individual incomes were subject to either the normal tax or a surtax or
both. As the names suggest, the normal tax was meant to be the primary source of revenues
during nonemergencies. The surtax was used to meet revenue shortfalls typically occurring
during wars or crises. The normal tax was not assessed on dividend income, but the surtax
was. To compute a single tax rate on dividend income, then, we take a weighted average of
11surtax rates assessed on each net income class, where the weights are fractions of dividend
income for each class. (See the appendix for details.)
Both tax rates shown in Table 2 are nearly constant over the 1925–29 period, a period
of stable tax policy, and low when compared to rates during and after World War II. The
tax rate on corporate proﬁts was on average 14.6 percent, and the tax rate on dividends was
on average 10.3 percent.
3.2. Capital Resource Costs. By “resource cost,”we mean the tax-unadjusted cost of
attaining the asset. In the case of tangible capital, it is reproduction costs. We need estimates
of the costs of capital assets, both tangible and intangible. We show that accounting for
only tangible capital leads to the conclusion that the stock market in 1929 was close to
30 percent overvalued. Taking account of intangible capital as well—which Fisher (1930)
argued was economically important—leads to the opposite conclusion: the stock market
was not overvalued. In this way we see that inclusion of intangible capital is crucial in the
analysis.
3.2.1. Tangible Corporate Assets. We start with the resource cost of tangible capital,
by which we mean things like structures, equipment, and inventories, and add to the BEA
measure of that the value of land in the corporate sector. Prior to 1947, inventories are
not reported by the BEA so we instead use the value of inventories from balance sheets on
corporate tax forms available from the IRS’s Statistics of Income. For corporate land, we
use nonresidential land from corporate balance sheets reported in Goldsmith (1956) and the
Statistics of Income.

















The Ratio of U.S. Corporate Tangible Capital and Land to GNP, 1925-2000
In Figure 3, we plot the total resource cost of end-of-period tangible capital plus the
value of land, both relative to GNP, for the period 1925–2000. In 1929, the resource cost
of total measured, tangible capital, which includes the value of inventories and land, was
1.4 times GNP.10 This ratio changed little until the Great Depression period, when output
fell more than 30 percent. By postwar standards, 1.4 times GNP is high. But tax rates on
capital were much higher in the postwar period.
Using the average tax rates in Table 2 and our formula (1), we compute a fundamental
value of 1.26 times GNP (= (1−.103)×1.4) for tangible capital alone. Our estimate for the
actual market value is 1.67 GNP—33 percent higher than the fundamental value of tangible
capital.
133.2.2. Intangible Corporate Assets: The determining factor. De Long and Shleifer
(1991) and Rappoport and White (1993) both argue that the stock market was signiﬁcantly
overvalued in August 1929—by as much as 30 percent.11 Since our estimate so far includes
only corporations’ tangible assets, an overvaluation of 30 percent is consistent with predic-
tions of standard growth theory only if the value of intangible assets was negligible. Was
it? Fisher (1930) did not think so. He based his view that stock prices were low in 1929
largely on his view that intangible assets were economically important. In this section, we
use data that Fisher (1930) did not have to derive a conservative estimate for the value of
all intangible capital at the time of the crash. In particular, data from the U.S. national
accounts and sources used by the BEA suggest that the value of intangible capital at that
time was at least as high as 0.57 times 1929 GNP.
Investments in intangible capital include investments in scientiﬁc research and invention,
in patent and monopoly rights, and in organizational capital. Fisher (1930) provides some
anecdotal evidence that these types of investments were signiﬁcant in 1929 and were resulting
in high economic proﬁts and high stock values.
According to Fisher (1930), industrial research increased signiﬁcantly after World War
I. Scientists from universities and government labs moved to industry jobs in part because
their real wages had fallen signiﬁcantly with wartime inﬂation. An example Fisher cites is the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company which employed 4,000 scientists, “more than
any university could equal”[Fisher, 1930, p. 125]. Fisher also cites a study of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which found that research was being done at 59
percent of the 599 manufacturing ﬁrms surveyed. Examples of new inventions reported in
14“almost every day’s paper”(p. 127) at the time include rivetless bridges, distilled coal for fuel
oil, front-drive cars, pulp made from cornstalk, railroads requiring no overhead wire, artiﬁcial
silk, and automata with electric eyes. In his ﬁscal year 1928–29 report, the Commissioner of
Patents noted that more patents had been granted during the previous ten years than over
the 100 year span 1789–1889 [Fisher, 1930, p. 127]. Implicitly, Fisher’s view is that these
inventions and patents had led to a large stock of intangible capital and would continue to
for some time.
Fisher (1930) also cites “management engineering”(p. 144) as a reason for increased
stock values. What Fisher means by this is the introduction of methods for better coordi-
nating of production and sales and for better planning of plant layouts and the subdivision
of tasks. Fisher refers to it as the “Fordizing”(p. 142) of business. He cites a study done
by the NBER, which concluded that “the greater complexity of business problems and of
the organization necessary to cope with them, have forced attention upon better methods of
coordinating the plans and the work of specialists and executives”[Fisher, 1930, p. 143]. In
other words, these investments enhanced the stock of corporate intangible capital.
Although Fisher had many good examples of intangible capital, he did not have suﬃcient
data to actually measure it. We do. As we show in McGrattan and Prescott (2000), we
can estimate the value of intangible capital using data from the U.S. national income and
product accounts, available since 1929. In particular, we can infer KI from the following
relation between after-tax NIPA proﬁts and corporate capital stocks:
Π=iKT +( i − g)(1 − τprof)KI (2)
15where Π is after-tax NIPA proﬁts, i is the real interest rate, and g is the trend growth rate
of real output.12 Two assumptions are needed to derive equation (2). First, we assume that
the after-tax rate of return for tangible corporate capital is equal to the rate of return for
intangible corporate capital and all other types of capital. (This is i in (2).) Otherwise,
ﬁrms would not be operating in the interest of their owners. Second, we assume that tax
policy is unchanging, so that steady-state analysis is appropriate.13
To see why (2) holds, consider how the BEA computes NIPA corporate proﬁts. Suppose
that the true income from capital in the corporate sector is rTKT + rIKI,w h e r erT and
rI are rental rates for tangible capital and intangible capital, respectively. If we subtract
depreciation allowances for tangible capital, property taxes, and any expenses like R&D
that are related to intangible investment, we have the BEA measure of before-tax corporate
proﬁts. This is the income subject to corporate proﬁts tax. Thus, the BEA measure of
after-tax corporate proﬁts is
Π=( 1− τprof)(rTKT + rIKI − δTKT − τpropKT − XI) (3)
where δT is the depreciation rate of tangible capital, τprop is the property tax rate, and
XI = K
I − (1 − δI)KI is intangible investment. In McGrattan and Prescott (2003a), we
show that the real after-tax return to tangible investment is (1−τprof)(rT −δT −τprop), while
the real return to intangible investment is rI − δI. The return on intangible investment is
not aﬀected by the corporate income tax rate because intangible investment can be expensed
while tangible investment must be capitalized. Equation (2) follows immediately from the
fact that both of these returns are equal to i, the real interest rate.
16Using (2), we can infer the resource cost of intangible capital using observations on
after-tax corporate proﬁts (Figure 1), the resource cost of tangible capital (Figure 3), and
the tax rate on corporate proﬁts (Table 2). We also need estimates of the real interest rate
(i) and the trend growth rate of the economy (g).
We start with an estimate of the real interest rate i. Because of unmeasured intangible
investment, we cannot directly infer i from corporate proﬁts and corporate capital. But we
can infer i from data for the noncorporate sector, which invests only a negligible amount in
scientiﬁc research, organizational capital, and other intangibles; most of noncorporate capital
is housing, farmland, and consumer durables. To construct i, we take the ratio of after-tax
noncorporate proﬁts—rental income, proprietors’ capital income, net interest, and services
of government and consumer capital—to the stock of capital generating these proﬁts.14 In
1929, this ratio is 4.73 percent. For the period 1929–2000, the ratio averages 4 percent.
As theory predicts, our estimate for i is similar in magnitude to the average return
on long-term debt.15 For example, nominal yields for Moody’s Aaa-rated corporate bonds
averaged 4.7 percent for the period 1925–29. We view this as a good approximation to the
real yield since the United States was on a gold standard during this period, and given
no trend in the relative price of gold, expectations of inﬂation should have been near zero.
Corporate bonds are fully taxable, so the relevant after-tax rates are somewhat lower. If
we use yields on municipal tax-exempt high-grade bonds, which averaged 4.1 percent over
1925–29, our estimates of both the value of intangible capital and the fundamental value of
the stock market would be higher. Thus, we view the 4.73 percent return on noncorporate
capital as a conservative (that is, high) estimate for the real interest rate.
17Now to the trend growth rate of the economy (g), which is the sum of the growth in
population and the growth in technology. Annual population growth had fallen to 1 percent
by the late 1920s, and annual technological growth averaged 1.6 percent in the pre–Depression
period, according to estimates of Kendrick (1961). Summing these, our estimate for g is 2.6
percent, which is also a conservative estimate. This value is lower than an arithmetic average
of growth rates of real GNP in the late 1920s. A larger value for g leads to higher estimates
for the value of intangible assets and the fundamental value of the stock market.16
We can now compute our estimate for the resource cost of intangible capital:
KI =
[Π/KT − i]
(1 − τprof)(i − g)
KT =
[.083/1.42 − .0473]
(1 − .146)(.0473− .026)
KT = .61KT. (4)
The values used in (4) are as follows: 0.146 is the average corporate tax rate in 1925–29;
0.083 is the average ratio of after-tax corporate proﬁts to GNP in 1925–29; 0.0473 is our
estimate of the real interest rate based on the noncorporate sector; 1.42 is the average ratio
of the resource cost of beginning-of-period tangible capital to GNP in 1926–29; and 0.026 is
our estimate of the trend growth rate. The result is a value for the resource cost of intangible
capital at least as large as 0.61 times the tangible capital stock. This estimate is consistent
with those found for the postwar United States and United Kingdom. (See McGrattan and
Prescott (2003a).) The fact that it is sizeable is also consistent with Fisher’s evidence.
We deduce from (1) and (4) that very low estimates of intangible capital and very high
returns to tangible capital are required for the conclusion that the stock market in 1929 was
overvalued. The reason is simple. By (1) and the fact that the value of tangible capital was
18high, a low prediction for the fundamental value of corporate equities requires a low value for
intangible capital. With the value of intangible capital low, the return on tangible capital
would have had to be extremely high in order to generate corporate proﬁt shares as high as
those observed in the 1920s. In the extreme case, with the value of intangibles equal to zero,
the real after-tax return on tangible capital has to be 5.9 percent (that is, Π/KT in equation
(4)), which is much higher than estimates based on national account data.
If we use our estimate in (4), we ﬁnd that a conservative estimate for the fundamental
value of U.S. corporations in 1929 was 1.9 times 1929 GNP, or 21.6 times 1929 after-tax
corporate earnings. A fundamental value any lower is not justiﬁed by observations on proﬁts,
capital stocks, tax rates, growth rates, and interest rates.
With the highest reasonable estimate of the market value of U.S. corporations at the
time being 1.67 times GNP, or 19 times corporate earnings, we conclude, as Fisher did,










In February 1930, Irving Fisher’s book The Stock Market Crash—and After was pub-
lished. In this book, Fisher explains why he believed that stock prices were low in the fall of
1929, placing much emphasis on the value of intangible assets. Galbraith (1955), like many
economic historians before and after him, viewed the crash as clear evidence that Fisher was
wrong. Fisher’s book attracted little attention, according to Galbraith (1955), because “one
trouble with being wrong is that it robs the prophet of his audience when he most needs it
19to explain why”(p. 146).
Here, we have examined this period with the aid of tools Fisher did not have: historical
data and modern theory. We have, in eﬀect, asked, what level of stock prices is justiﬁed by
the value of tangible and intangible assets owned by corporations, which we have called
the fundamental value. At the start, we set out to quantify by how much the market
was overvalued relative to this fundamental value. Theory and data forced us to conclude
that it was actually undervalued. Our conservative estimate of the fundamental value of
U.S. corporations in 1929 is no less than 21 times corporate earnings (or 1.9 times GNP),
whereas a conservative estimate for the market value of U.S. corporate equities in 1929 is no
greater than 19 times corporate earnings (or 1.67 times GNP). In other words, with regard
to the value of the 1929 stock market, Irving Fisher was right.
But, the primary goal of this study is not to assess the acumen of Fisher. Rather, our
goal is to further the development of a theoretical benchmark useful for determining whether
the stock market is overvalued or undervalued at a point in time. The value of such a theory


































In this appendix, we describe sources for the data used in the ﬁgures and tables of the
main text, and we display some detailed data behind some calculations in the text.
Figure 1
• After-tax corporate proﬁts: See notes for Table A1 for 1925–28; and U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis (1929–2000), NIPA Table 1.14, for 1929 and after.
• GNP: Romer (1989), Table 2, for period before 1929; and U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (1929–2000), NIPA Table 1.9, for 1929 and after.
Figure 2
• Market value of all U.S. corporations: Federal Reserve Board (1945–2000). Add market
value of domestic corporations (in the level table of ‘Corporate Equities’) and the sum of
corporate net debt (= total liabilities − total ﬁnancial assets + corporate equities held
directly or in mutual funds) derived from level tables of domestic corporations issuing
equity. See McGrattan and Prescott (2003b) for complete details.
• Market value of all listed NYSE companies: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1932–
2000).
• GNP: See notes to Figure 1.
Figure 3
• Tangible corporate capital: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1925–2000), ﬁxed asset
Table 6.1.
21• Inventories: U.S. Internal Revenue Service (1916–99), corporate balance sheets, before
1946; and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (1929–2000), NIPA Table 5.12, for 1946
and after.
• Land: Goldsmith (1956), Table W-30, before 1946; and U.S. Internal Revenue Service
(1916–99), corporate balance sheets, for 1946 and after.
• GNP: See notes to Figure 1.
Table 1
• Market value and earnings of 135 industrials: Sloan (1936, p. 5).
• S&P company list, market values, earnings: See notes for Table A2.
• Price-earnings ratio of 45 industrials: Fisher (1930, p. 86), Chart 11.
• Number of NYSE companies: New York Stock Exchange (1960), historical section.
• Market value of all listed NYSE companies: See notes to Figure 2.
• GNP: See notes to Figure 1.
Table 2
• Tax rate on proﬁts: Rows in Table A1—“Proﬁts tax liability, NIPA”to “Proﬁts before
taxes, NIPA.”
• Tax rate on dividends: U.S. Internal Revenue Service (1916–99), basic tables for indi-
vidual returns (Tables 2 and 7 for years 1925–29) and instructions for 1040, which have
the surtax rates. Tax rates are constructed as follows: take the ratio of “Net income”to
“Number of returns”for each net income class from Table 2; ﬁnd the marginal surtax
rate for that net income class in the 1040 instructions; multiply the marginal surtax
rate for each net income class by the fraction of dividend income earned by that class
22found in Table 7; and add across classes to get a weighted average.
Table A1
• NIPA proﬁts after-tax, 1925–28: All original data sources listed in U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis (1985), Table 3. Some data are missing because they are not in the
public domain. Any missing ﬁgures appear in bold and are estimated to be proportional
to “Total receipts less total deductions,”with the factor of proportionality equal to the
1929 ratio.
Table A2
• Company list: Standard and Poor’s (1990, p. 115).
• Market values: CRSP monthly stock database.
• Earnings: Moody’s Investor Services (1930) and Poor’s Publishing Company (1930).
Other Data Cited in Text
• Population: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1990), Table 16.
• GNP deﬂator: Romer (1989), Table 2.
• Return on noncorporate capital: McGrattan and Prescott (2003c).
• Bond yields: Federal Reserve Board (1943), Table 128.
23Table A1. Relation of Corporate Profits and Taxes in NIPA and IRS, 1925–29 ($ billions)
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
Total receipts less total deductions, IRS 9.3 9.5 8.7 10.7 11.9
Plus: Adjustment for misreporting on income tax returns .5 .6 .5 .5 .7
Posttabulation amendments and revisions .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Income of organizations not ﬁling corporation income .0 .0 .0 .0 .1
Depletion on domestic minerals .5 .6 .5 .5 .6
Adjustment to depreciate expenditures for mining exploration .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
State and local corporate proﬁts tax accruals .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Bad debt adjustment .7 .7 .8 .8 .9
Net income received from equities in foreign corporations .2 .2 .2 .2 .2
Less: Tax-return measures of:
Gains, net of losses, from sale of property .5 .6 .5 .6 .7
Dividends received from domestic corporations 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.6
Income on equities in foreign corporations and branches .3 .3 .3 .4 .4
Costs of trading or issuing corporate securities .2 .2 .2 .3 .3
Equals: Proﬁts before taxes, NIPA 9.3 9.3 8.3 9.9 10.6
Federal income and excess proﬁts taxes, IRS 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2
Plus: Posttabulation amendments and revisions .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Amounts paid to U.S. Treasury by Federal Reserve banks .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
State and local corporate proﬁts tax accruals .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Less: U.S. tax credits claimed for foreign taxes paid .0 .0 .0 .0 .0
Equals: Proﬁts tax liability, NIPA 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4
Proﬁts after tax, NIPA 7.9 7.9 7.0 8.5 9.2
Proﬁts after tax relative to GNP (%) 8.7 8.1 7.3 8.7 8.8
2
4Table A2. Market Value at Month-End August 1929 and Net Earnings for Year 1929,
All Companies in S&P Composite Index
Market Value Net Earnings Price/Earnings
Companies ($ millions) ($ millions) Ratio
50 Industrials
General Motors 3,132.0 236.5 13.2
General Electric 2,852.0 77.3 36.9
U.S. Steel 2,086.1 172.4 12.1
Standard Oil of New Jersey 1,753.1 120.9 14.5
Union Carbide & Carbon 1,114.1 35.4 31.4
Anaconda Copper 1,060.3 69.1 15.3
Woolworth (F.W.) 967.7 35.7 27.1
Standard Oil of California 963.4 46.6 20.7
Allied Chemical & Dye 762.3 27.4 27.8
Sears, Roebuck 754.8 30.1 25.1
Texas Company 685.7 48.3 14.2
Radio Corp. 647.5 11.5 56.4
Reynolds Tobacco 603.5 32.2 18.7
International Nickel 598.9 20.2 29.7
International Harvester 590.2 31.3 18.8
Eastman Kodak 483.9 21.6 22.4
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 478.6 19.4 24.6
Standard Brands 476.3 17.3 27.5
American Can 440.4 19.8 22.2
Kresge (S.S.) 438.7 14.8 29.6
National Biscuit 436.0 19.7 22.1
Kennecott Copper 418.9 52.1 8.0
American Tobacco 394.3 27.0 14.6
Burroughs Adding Machine 352.5 11.7 30.2
General Foods 340.5 19.4 17.5
Bethlehem Steel 331.5 35.2 9.4
United Fruit 314.3 17.8 17.7
Pullman, Inc. 290.3 17.7 16.4
Timken Roller Bearing 261.5 14.2 18.5
Chrysler Corp. 300.9 21.9 13.7
American Smelting & Reﬁning 226.9 18.3 12.4
Westinghouse Air Brake 203.8 8.8 23.1
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 204.5 13.1 15.7
National Cash Register 151.6 6.2 24.3
Paramount Publix 146.7 15.5 9.4
St. Joseph Lead 138.9 7.5 18.6
American Locomotive 94.2 4.2 22.7
Allis Chalmers 90.8 4.3 21.0
Stewart Warner 84.2 6.8 12.3
U.S. Rubber 75.3 −2.7 −27.8
International Paper 74.3 −4.3 −17.2
Briggs Manufacturing 73.6 2.4 30.3
Twentieth Century–Fox Film Corp. 65.0 8.4 7.7
American Sugar Reﬁning 35.3 3.5 10.1
Abitibi Paper 27.5 1.9 14.1
Endicott Johnson 26.6 2.0 13.0
Armour and Co. 13.5 0.8 16.5
Cuban American Sugar 12.8 1.1 12.0
American Woolen 6.6 −4.2 −1.6
International Mercantile Marine 3.0 2.4 1.2
Total, 50 Industrials 26,085.5 1,420.8 18.4
25Table A2 (cont.)
Market Value Net Earnings Price/Earnings
Companies ($ millions) ($ millions) Ratio
20 Railroads
Pennsylvania R.R. 1,253.0 101.4 12.4
New York Central 1,187.3 78.1 15.2
Canadian Paciﬁc 772.2 36.8 21.0
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 717.2 54.8 13.1
Union Paciﬁc 655.8 45.3 14.5
Southern Paciﬁc 572.6 34.4 16.7
Chesapeake & Ohio 409.4 32.2 12.7
Baltimore & Ohio 348.0 26.4 13.2
Norfolk & Western 332.2 40.9 8.1
Great Northern 311.4 25.7 12.1
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western 276.2 13.3 20.7
Northern Paciﬁc 275.9 21.8 12.7
Southern Railway 197.6 15.1 13.1
Illinois Central 193.0 12.4 15.6
Reading Co. 185.7 18.3 10.1
Louisville & Nashville 176.7 13.7 12.9
Atlantic Coast Line 161.0 19.9 8.1
Chicago & North Western 158.9 14.0 11.3
Lehigh Valley 112.5 7.4 15.3
New York, Chicago & St. Louis 64.8 5.2 12.4
Total, 20 Railroads 8,361.2 617.0 13.6
20 Public Utilities
Consolidated Edison of New York 1,887.0 32.1 58.7
United Gas Improvement 1,098.0 27.6 39.7
North American Co. 942.4 27.0 34.9
Columbia Gas system 850.9 26.4 32.2
International Telephone & Telegraph 685.6 17.7 38.7
Public Service of New Jersey 532.0 22.1 24.1
American Power & Light 351.9 3.3 105.4
Detroit Edison 348.1 13.1 26.5
Paciﬁc Gas & Electric 283.1 10.9 26.0
American Water Works & Electric 281.6 6.6 42.5
Standard Power & Light 245.6 7.5 32.9
Western Union Telegraph 233.4 17.5 13.4
Peoples Gas of Chicago 209.4 6.3 33.3
Southern California Edison 202.3 7.7 26.1
Paciﬁc Telephone & Telegraph 191.5 10.7 17.9
National Power & Light 171.5 11.8 14.5
Brooklyn Union Gas 125.5 5.6 22.6
Brooklyn-Manhattan Transit 45.8 5.0 9.1
Twin City Rapid Transit 9.0 1.0 8.6
Interborough Rapid Transit 7.4 3.1 2.4
Total, 20 Public Utilities 8,702.1 263.1 33.1
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2Another approach that has been taken to determine whether the stock market in the
late 1920s was overvalued is to estimate the present value of future dividends using dividend
and interest rate data. With this approach, ﬁndings have varied. Compare, for example,
Shiller’s (1981) Figure 1 with Donaldson and Kamstra’s (1996) Figure 7. The reason is that
accurately estimating the present value of dividends in this way is diﬃcult, if not impossible.
3Hall (2001) has an alternative way to estimate the value of corporate intangible cap-
ital, namely, the value of corporate equity and debt less the value of corporate tangible
assets. His method cannot be used for determining whether the stock market is overvalued
or undervalued as it assumes that the market is correctly valued.
4The large decline is also coincident with the speech on October 25 by Attorney General
Mitchell, who said he would deal vigorously with antitrust violations. See Bittlingmayer
(2002).
275The recovery in stock prices is evidence that a Great Depression was unexpected
in 1929 and early 1930. Additional evidence of that is provided by Dominguez, Fair, and
Shapiro (1988), who use historical data to forecast future output.
6This estimate is essentially the same as that of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001), who
use the same data sources.
7Stock prices fell about 30 percent between the end of August and the end of December
1929. Multiplying our estimate of the P/E ratio for the end of August by 0.7 gives 13.3.
This is equal to the ratio of the end-of-year market capitalization to 1929 earnings reported
by Standard and Poor’s (1990).
8Thus, any measure that we get of the value of corporate equity in 1929 overstates the
total value of corporations, equity plus debt.
9For details on the derivation of equation (1), see McGrattan and Prescott (2003a). In
McGrattan and Prescott (2003a), we also include the possibility of capital subsidies which
are not relevant for 1929.
10We have left out capital of foreign subsidiaries, which is also not included in BEA
measures. But this capital is insigniﬁcant in 1929.
11Both studies take a very diﬀerent approach from ours here.
12For details on the derivation of equation (2), see McGrattan and Prescott (2000,
2003a).
13Support for this assumption is Table 2 and the time series of macro aggregates in
Kendrick (1961).
2814We estimate that half of net interest payments are intermediate ﬁnancial services and
subtract that half from noncorporate proﬁts.
15Due to a modest equity risk premium, our estimate for i is slightly lower than the
average return on equity after taxes and costs of diversifying. See McGrattan and Prescott
(2003c) for a comparison of asset returns.
16We should also note that higher growth rates are associated with higher interest rates
since the interest rate is the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution. A very low prediction
for intangible capital for the United States in 1929 requires a historically high interest rate
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